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Forthcoming in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem Denition: We investigate multinational rms inspection and pricing strategies to address the
challenges of combating child labor in global supply chains. We also examine how several factors (such as
information disclosure, goodwill loss, inspection cost, external monitoring by NGOs, and penalty scheme)
a¤ect rmsincentives to use di¤erent strategies to combat child labor.
Academic/Practical Relevance: Nearly 200 million children are engaged in child labor, many in developing
countries that are part of the supply base of global manufacturing networks. However, there has been little
research on evaluating the impact of rmsstrategies and NGOsinitiatives on child labor.
Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model based on a two-tier supply chain, in which a multinational
rm in a developed country sells the product made by a supplier in a developing country.
Results: If internal inspections are economical, a global rm can reduce the incidence of child labor by in-
specting the suppliers use of child labor. Otherwise, the rm can deter the suppliers child labor employment
by o¤ering a su¢ ciently high wholesale price, or by simultaneously using internal inspections and a medium
wholesale price. The latter strategy should be adopted only when information about the rms inspection
policy can be informed credibly. This strategy combats child labor more e¤ectively when a higher penalty
is levied onto the suppliers use of child labor.
Managerial Implications: A multinational rm which adopts a zero-tolerance policy should consider disclos-
ing its e¤ort to combat child labor (e.g., through social responsibility report), whereas it should take extra
caution when using other penalty schemes. NGOs should help raise the rms goodwill cost (e.g., through
campaigns and consumer education), but they should be careful about helping to reduce the rms inspection
cost (e.g., by improving a monitoring system). To prevent children from going back to work after initial
removal, a su¢ cient amount of compensation should be provided to those children, especially when rms
rely on inspections without paying a high wholesale price to suppliers.
1 Introduction
International Labor Organization (ILO) denes child labor as work that is mentally, physically,
socially or morally dangerous and harmful to children; and interferes with their schooling. In
2012 there were 168 million child laborers worldwide, accounting for around 11% of the entire child
population (ILO 2013). According to ILO, child labor is deemed as a severe human rights violation:
All child labour, and especially the worst forms, should be eliminated. It not only undermines the
roots of human nature and rights but also threatens future social and economic progress worldwide.
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Trade, competitiveness and economic e¢ ciency should not be a pretext for this abuse.
Alarmingly, the decline of child labor has slowed down (ILO 2010). The progress to end child
labor is challenged by the prevalence of global outsourcing. Economic research suggests that rms
global search for cheap labor has boosted the demand for child labor (Acaroglu and Dagdemir
2010). There are numerous examples of items produced by child labor, including cotton from
Uzbekistan, cocoa from Ivory Coast, carpets and garments from India and Pakistan, and electronic
products and toys from China (U.S. Department of Labor 2014). In these countries, child labor is
often treated as a moral issue, and it lacks e¤ective regulations (ORourke 2003). Moreover, child
labor enables local suppliers to keep production costs down, and the surplus from such low costs is
then passed on to multinational rms along the global value chain (Locke 2003). Therefore, many
multinational rms lack motivation to control their local suppliersuse of child labor.
Even when some rms intend to address child labor in their supply chains, they are hindered
by the lack of direct control over their suppliersuse of child labor. As such, rms often adopt
two indirect approaches to tackle the issue: internal inspections and penalty schemes (Kolk and
van Tulder 2002a). These approaches, however, have some drawbacks. First, internal inspections
on child labor are costly and imperfect. Monitoring of labor conditions requires investigation
of production sites, which is often challenging or virtually impossible (International Finance
Corporation 2002). For example, in carpet production in India, 175,000 looms were estimated
to be in the Uttar Paradesh carpet belt alone, and most were located in small workshops and
even local households. IKEA, one of major retailers of the Indian carpets, concluded that no
one could monitor such a fragmented production process (Bartlett et al. 2006). Kolk and van
Tulder (2002b) also mention the complexity of inspecting suppliers in the garment industry because
sourcing networks may involve thousands of factories spread across multiple countries. Second, it
is likewise costly for a rm to inuence its suppliers practice through penalty schemes. A rm
may deter its supplier from hiring child labor by requiring the supplier to take costly corrective
actions when child labor is found or by threatening to terminate the contract. However, for this
threat to be e¤ective, the rm may have to leave considerable prots to the supplier, which in turn
will increase the rms outsourcing cost. For example, Obeetee, an Indian carpet manufacturer,
increased wages signicantly as an incentive to loom owners, while informing them (in writing)
that if found employing child labor, they would lose their business and be blacklisted from doing
any future business with the company (International Finance Corporation 2002). Similarly, Bayer
CropScience put 5% of its procurement price as a bonus for crop farmers who did not use child
labor (Subramanian 2013).1
In light of these challenges, several initiatives have been undertaken. First, to impose pressure
1 In order to urge Bayer Group to eliminate child labor, a group of European NGOs cosigned an open letter in
2003, which states: In order to prevent your suppliers from using child labor, the prices paid to their products need
be high enough so that employment of adults is protable to the suppliers(Subramanian 2013).
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on global rms, third-party organizations have developed programs to monitor child labor practices
at local production sites, and launched consumer education campaigns to increase consumer aware-
ness of child labor. Due to extensive media reach coupled with advances in information technology,
rms that sell the products involved in child labor would likely incur a reputation loss in both con-
sumer and nancial markets (Smith 2003). Second, rms have undertaken a variety of strategies
to improve their abilities to monitor supplierspractices in a more cost-e¤ective manner (U.S. De-
partment of Labor 2000). For example, rms collaborate through Child Labor Elimination Group
in the agriculture industry of India or through the Atlanta Agreement in the global footwear indus-
try. A data base system is set up to record information gathered from various auditing programs
(e.g., the ILOs International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor). Third, rms have been
encouraged to disclose their policies and e¤orts in combating child labor to their stakeholders in-
cluding their employees, supply chain partners and third-party organizations (International Finance
Corporation 2002). Companies such as Apple, Sony and Nike publish social responsibility reports
every year, which disclose the measures taken to combat child labor. Recently, a bill on supply
chain information disclosure the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (Senate Bill 657)
(hereinafter the Act) is passed, which requires manufacturers and retailers in California with
annual revenue of $100 million or more to publicly disclose to which degree the rms are engaged
in combating forced labor (including child labor) in their supply chains. In particular, those rms
are required to disclose their inspection policies on whether they have internal auditing on their
suppliers, and such information is recorded by websites such as https://www.knowthechain.org/.
Despite the signicance of child labor problems in the world, to date, there has been little
research on evaluating the impact of these initiatives on child labor in global supply chains. Al-
though there is an increasing number of empirical work on information disclosure in the context
of environmental violations (e.g., To¤el and Short 2011, Doshi et al. 2013), which suggests the
benets of information disclosure, it is unclear whether such benets can also be achieved through
rmsdisclosure of their inspection policies on child labor. If not, are there any potential measures
that can enhance the benet of information disclosure regarding child labor? This paper aims to
provide insights by examining how the initiatives to improve inspections and information disclo-
sure a¤ect rms strategies and incentives to control their suppliersuse of child labor. To this
end, we develop a game-theoretic model based on a two-tier supply chain, in which a multinational
manufacturer (she) outsources her production to a local supplier (he) through a wholesale-price
contract2. The supplier has an option to use child labor in place of legitimate labor at a lower
cost. However, child labor, if exposed to the public, would incur a goodwill loss to the manufac-
turer. The manufacturer may carry out costly (but imperfect) internal inspections to monitor her
2We consider a wholesale-price contract because it is most common in practice (e.g., Kalkanc¬et al. 2011, Hwang
et al. 2016) and in related literature (e.g., Hwang et al. 2006, Hsieh and Liu 2010, Chen and Deng 2013, Guo et al.
2016, Plambeck and Taylor 2016), while extending the analysis to a deferred payment contract.
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suppliers child labor practice. When the manufacturer nds the suppliers use of child labor or
when a third party does so through external monitoring, the manufacturer may require the supplier
to take corrective actions by removing child laborers and compensating them, or alternatively the
manufacturer may terminate the contract with her supplier. We examine the impact of information
disclosure by comparing the following two scenarios: In a non-disclosure scenario, the supplier and
third party organizations are unable to observe the manufacturers inspection e¤ort, whereas in a
disclosure scenario they are informed of the manufacturers inspection e¤ort.
We summarize our main ndings in the following three aspects3:
1. Strategies to combat child labor: A global manufacturer may use three di¤erent strategies
to control the use of child labor in her supply chain. First, when internal inspections are economical,
the manufacturer can reduce the incidence of child labor by undertaking inspections to detect and
remove child labor hired by the supplier. Second, when internal inspections are costly, the man-
ufacturer can deter the suppliers child labor employment by o¤ering a su¢ ciently high wholesale
price, which will guarantee the supplier a high prot margin and thus cause him a high potential
loss when he loses a contract with the manufacturer. Third, the manufacturer could simultaneously
use internal inspections and a medium wholesale price to deter the employment of child labor. This
strategy should be adopted only in the disclosure scenario because the supplier is willing to accept
the medium wholesale price and employs no child labor only when he is informed that the manu-
facturers inspections are comprehensive. This strategy combats child labor more e¤ectively when
the manufacturer can enforce a higher penalty onto the supplier from internal inspections.
2. Factors that a¤ect manufacturers strategies: As expected, increasing a goodwill cost
(e.g., by enhancing consumer awareness) or adding more value to business relation helps reduce child
labor. However, the manufacturer may replace price premium with inspection in combating child
labor, so that reducing inspection costs does not necessarily reduce child labor. When inspections
are costly, global manufacturers faced with high potential goodwill loss would choose to combat
child labor by o¤ering high wholesale prices, which could incentivize suppliers not to employ child
labor in the rst place. However, when inspections become less costly, these manufacturers may rely
entirely on internal inspections (instead of o¤ering high wholesale prices) to reduce the incidence
of child labor. This could introduce more child labor because inspections are imperfect and may
not always nd child labor employed by suppliers. In contrast, third partiesmonitoring may or
may not raise manufacturers inspection e¤ort. The impact of these factors is una¤ected by the
disclosure of the manufacturers inspection e¤ort, except that the unintended consequence of low
3The results from our base model can be potentially applied to other issues in social responsibility and envi-
ronmental sustainability of supply chains, including the cases in which the supplier can nd cheaper, but socially
undesirable, sources of inputs (e.g., hiring illegal immigrants, skipping pollution-treatment process, or using cheap
material with potential safety or environmental problems). In §7, we enrich our model and analysis by considering a
households decision to send its child to work.
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inspection costs is less likely to occur with the disclosure.
3. Information disclosure: Although policy makers seem to advocate information disclosure
in supply chains, information disclosure may not always reduce child labor. On the one hand,
manufacturers disclosure of their e¤orts to combat child labor can help reduce child labor by
enabling manufacturers to use the combined strategy of internal inspections and medium wholesale
prices. On the other hand, it is possible that information disclosure gives manufacturers incentives
to o¤er low wholesale prices and disclose low inspection e¤orts. This could inadvertently lead
suppliers to employ child labor. Such adverse e¤ect could be mitigated by several measures including
a zero-tolerance policy (although our result indicates that this is not always a preferred policy).
2 Literature Review
In this section, we review three most related research streams.
(1) Economics of Child Labor and Inspection. Economic research on child labor mainly
examines the issue from two aspects: supply and demand of child labor. Research on the supply
side analyzes factors that a¤ect parentsincentives to send their children to work. These factors
include agriculture output (Beegle et al. 2006), crop price under trade liberalization (Edmonds and
Pavcnik 2005), and household holding of lands (Basu et al. 2010). Other papers, including ours,
focus on the demand side and study how to induce employers to hire less child labor (Basu 1999,
Basu and Zarghamee 2009, Davies 2005). Most economic papers implicitly assume that pressure
imposed on local employers directly come from concerned consumers and organizations. We instead
study the case in which such pressure is transferred from consumers to local employers through
global supply chains. This perspective captures the current trend that child labor is increasingly
involved in the items procured by multinational rms through global outsourcing, and that end-
consumers have inuence on multinational rms but less so on local employers of child labor.
Broadly, our paper is also related to economic research on inspection and compliance in law
enforcement (including labor and environmental laws). Becker (1968) considers an enforcement
authority who combines random audits with penalties to maximize the probability of seizing viola-
tors. Tsebelis (1990) considers a one-shot simultaneous game (called inspection game) to model
the interactions between the enforcement authority and violators. See Polinsky and Shavell (2007)
for a survey of related economic theories. The focus of this stream of literature is the e¤ectiveness of
penalties including imprisonment, and the enforcement authority is usually a government. Di¤erent
from this literature, our paper aims to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of various initiatives to improve
inspections and information disclosure, and enforcement e¤ort is mainly exerted by a multinational
rm. In addition to inspections, the rm can use a contract price to induce compliance from a
supplier. Interaction between these two means in a supply chain leads to novel results.
(2) Socially Responsible Supply Chain Management. This stream of work aims to achieve
an overall social goal by coordinating various supply chain members. Babich and Tang (2012) study
5
mechanisms for dealing with product adulteration such as deferred payment. Kim (2014) investi-
gates the relationship between a regulators inspection activities and a production rms voluntary
disclosure of self-noncompliance. Chen and Lee (2016) focus on screening responsible suppliers
through delayed payment contracts. Guo et al. (2016) analyze a manufacturers outsourcing choice
between responsible and risky suppliers when consumers are socially conscious. Kraft et al. (2016)
use an experiment to study how supply chain visibility impacts consumersvaluations of a com-
panys social responsibility practices in its supply chain. Kalkanci et al. (2016) show that if a
government mandates rms to disclose what they learn about their social and environmental im-
pacts in their supply chains, it could deter rms from measuring and improving those impacts.
Chen et al. (2016) nd that it may be benecial for a buyer to reveal her supplier list even if
revealed suppliers face a di¤erent level of scrutiny from non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
than unrevealed suppliers.
Similar to our paper, Plambeck and Taylor (2016) study how a buyer can motivate its supplier
to exert more e¤ort to comply with labor and environmental standards. Our paper di¤ers in
several aspects. First, while Plambeck and Taylor (2016) assume a xed wholesale price, our model
considers a global rm that determines a wholesale price as well as a level of internal inspection. As
discussed in §1, the wholesale price has a signicant inuence on the incentive of a supplier hiring
child labor, and our analysis hinges crucially on the interplay between these two levers. Second,
consistent with industry practice, a global rm in our model can use various penalty schemes for a
supplier who employs child labor (corrective action, contract termination, or combination of both),
and it has some inuence over the magnitude of the suppliers potential loss through endogenous
choice of the wholesale price and the compensation paid to a child worker. Third, we examine the
impact of information disclosure on a global rms joint decision on inspection level and wholesale
price, and its consequence on child labor. Similar in spirit, Plambeck and Taylor (2016) study the
impact of a buyers pre-commitment to auditing e¤ort but under a xed wholesale price. Although
they state that if the supplier were unable to hide, the ability to pre-commit would cause the
buyer to do more auditing, we nd that this is not always true when wholesale price is determined
endogenously. Lastly, we consider a unique feature of the child labor problem by analyzing a
households decision to send its child to work.
(3) Quality Management. Our paper is related to a stream of papers that study the joint e¤ects of
contract, inspections, and information. Hwang et al. (2006) study how to control suppliersproduct
quality through a combination of inspections and contracts, but they do not consider the role of
information in inspections. There are some papers that examine the role of information in quality
investment under a xed wholesale price (e.g., observability of information in Hsieh and Liu 2010,
information noise in third-party certication in Chen and Deng 2013). Some papers study the joint
impact of contract, inspections and information on product quality, but their focus is di¤erent from
ours. Balachandran and Radhakrishnan (2005) consider the setting in which a product comprises
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components made by a buyer and a supplier, and examine how the information of the buyers quality
e¤ort shapes the design of penalties imposed onto the supplier during internal and external failures.
Baiman et al. (2000) study the impact of the suppliers knowledge of the buyers inspection e¤ort
on product quality. They nd that once information about the buyers inspection e¤ort is known to
the supplier, the supplier would make more e¤ort to improve quality, and therefore product quality
would always be improved. In contrast, in our paper, even if information about the buyers e¤ort
is known to the supplier in the disclosure scenario, it may induce more child labor, causing inferior
product quality in the socially responsible sense (although real product quality remains the same).
In general, defective products could be detected by manufacturers through sampling approaches
and inspection technology, and if not, they could be found later by consumers after they are sold
in the market. In contrast, a product made by child labor is not necessarily defective in product
functionality, and detection of child labor is more complicated because neither manufacturers nor
consumers can learn it from inspecting products. It may also involve a third stakeholder such
as NGOs. Manufacturers may need these organizations support, training, and information for
their internal inspections, and consumers may well get some information from these organizations.
Public policy such as the Act also plays a role in determining information disclosure.
3 The Model
We consider a decentralized supply chain in which a manufacturer (she) outsources her production
to a supplier (he) via a wholesale-price contract. The outsourced production quantity is xed, and
is normalized to one. We assume that the supplier needs one unit of labor to produce this product.
Let d denote the suppliers decision: d = 1 means that the supplier employs a child laborer, and
d = 0 means that the supplier employs an adult laborer. For ease of exposition, we consider the
case where the supplier chooses a pure strategy of either employing a child laborer or an adult
laborer. In addition, we analyze the case where the supplier may choose a mixed strategy as well as
the case where the supplier may hire only a portion of workforce with child labor. These cases lead
to similar equilibrium outcomes, and the key insights we obtain for a binary d continue to hold for
these cases. (More details are provided in the supplemental le which is available upon request.)
We denote by sH and sL the labor cost for the supplier to hire an adult and a child, respectively,
where sH > sL. Without loss of generality, all other production costs are normalized to 0. The
product is sold to the market at a xed retail price v (> 0).
The manufacturer decides the wholesale price w and the amount of e¤ort  to inspect the
suppliers employment of child labor. The e¤ort  determines the probability that the manufacturer
will detect the suppliers employment of child labor, if it exists, during her internal inspections.
We thus refer to  as the level of internal inspections. For tractable analysis, following Hwang
et al. (2006) and Babich and Tang (2012), we adopt a binary inspection level:  2 fL; Hg,
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where H (L) denotes high (low) inspection level, and L is set to 0 (i.e., no inspections).4 The
corresponding inspection costs are I (H) = I > 0 and I (L = 0) = 0, respectively. We consider
the following two scenarios: non-disclosure scenario and disclosure scenario.
In the non-disclosure scenario, the manufacturer does not disclose her inspection level . In
addition to internal inspections, child labor is also subject to monitoring by third parties (e.g.,
NGOs such as UNICEF and ILO, or the media). Let e (2 (0; 1)) denote the probability in this
scenario that the suppliers use of child labor, if it exists, will be detected through such external
inspections. If the manufacturer is found to use child labor in the outsourced production of her
product, she will su¤er from goodwill cost g (> 0), which includes short-term sales loss and long-
term damage in reputation. We can describe the sequence of decisions and events in this scenario
as follows (see Figure 1 for illustration):
(S1) The manufacturer o¤ers a wholesale price w to the supplier. The supplier accepts the contract
if he can earn a higher expected prot than his reservation prot (normalized to zero).
(S2) If the supplier accepts the contract, he makes a hiring decision on d and carries out production,
while the manufacturer chooses her inspection level . Since the supplier and manufacturer are
unaware of each others decision, following the literature (e.g., Babich and Tang 2012, Plambeck
and Taylor 2016), we assume that their decisions are simultaneous; i.e., they engage in a game of
imperfect information.
(S3) The manufacturer conducts internal inspections with the level .
(S4) Once the production is over, the manufacturer pays w to the supplier, and sells the product
to the market at the retail price v.
(S5) External inspections are conducted with the level e.
In the disclosure scenario, the manufacturer discloses  in its website (as required by the Act),
social responsibility report, contract with the supplier, or agreement with a third-party organization
who works with the manufacturer. In this scenario, third parties may react to the manufacturers
inspection e¤ort by choosing an external inspection level that depends on .5 We assume that if
4We set L to 0 for ease of exposition. All of our main results still hold even if 0 < L < H (i.e., low inspection
level instead of no inspections). Although the exact measurement of inspection e¤ort may not be easy in practice,
there is a clear di¤erence between the companies that regularly conduct internal inspections for child labor and those
that do not. For example, companies such as Apple, Sony and Nike audit their supplierslabor practices frequently.
However, companies such as IDEX, Caterpillar, and Danaher state that they do not verify their supply chains or
audit suppliers to evaluate risks of human tra¢ cking and slavery (see the online appendix for details). One may
interpret that these companies disclose no or low-level inspection e¤orts. Companies may rely on other organizations
(e.g., GoodWeave) for their internal inspections - in this case, the inspection cost in our model captures the fee paid
to those organizations.
5 In reality, the manufacturer who discloses low inspection e¤ort may draw attention from the media and third
parties. For example, KnowTheChain publicizes the names of the companies who disclosed that they did not audit
suppliers to evaluate risks of child labor after California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (KnowTheChain 2014).
Given the limited resources, third parties may then increase (decrease) their e¤ort of external inspection on those
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Figure 1: The Sequence of Decisions and Events
the disclosed level  is low (resp., high), third parties choose a high (resp., low) level of external
inspection; i.e., e(L) = eH (resp., e(H) = eL, where 0 < eL  eH < 1). Since the supplier has
information about the manufacturers internal inspection level before he accepts the contract, we
can revise the sequence above as follows (see Figure 1 where the manufacturers inspection decision
is shown in the dashed text box):
(S1) The manufacturer o¤ers a wholesale price w and discloses her inspection level . The supplier
decides whether to accept the contract or not.
(S2) If the supplier accepts the contract, he decides on d, and carries out production.
(S3) and (S4) are the same as (S3) and (S4), respectively.
(S5) External inspections are conducted with the level eH (resp., eL) if the level of internal inspec-
tions is L (resp., L).
For both non-disclosure and disclosure scenarios, we can express the manufacturers expected
prot U and the suppliers expected prot  as a function of (w; ; d). The manufacturers expected
prot U is given as
U (w; ; d) = v   w   I ()  e()gd (1  ) ; (1)
where e()gd (1  ) represents the expected goodwill cost. Recall that the manufacturer incurs
the goodwill cost g when: (i) child labor is employed by the supplier (i.e., d = 1); (ii) it passes the
manufacturers internal inspections with probability (1  );6 and (iii) it is detected and reported
to the public by third parties with probability e(). A similar assumption is made by Plambeck
and Taylor (2016) and Chen and Lee (2016). For ease of exposition, we dene dE  d (1  ) as the
expected amount of child labor that is used in outsourced production (and thus can be potentially
manufacturers who have disclosed low (high) inspection e¤ort. A similar assumption is made in Chen et al. (2016).
6Here we assume that if the suppliers use of child labor is detected (and thus corrected) by the manufacturer
internally, the manufacturer would not incur any goodwill cost. In reality, NGOs might still be able to identify the
suppliers past use of child labor, causing some goodwill loss to the manufacturer. Our supplemental analysis shows
that the key insights continue to hold for this case.
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exposed to the public). In our subsequent analysis, we use dE as one measure of the severity of the
child labor issue: dE = 0 in the best case where the supplier does not employ child labor, dE = 1
in the worse case where the supplier employs child labor and the manufacturer makes no e¤ort to
resolve the issue, and dE 2 (0; 1) in the moderate case where the supplier employs child labor and
the manufacturer makes some e¤ort to resolve the issue.
To express the suppliers expected prot , we need to assume a certain penalty scheme imposed
on the supplier when his use of child labor is discovered during internal or external inspections. In
what follows, we describe the base penalty scheme that is commonly observed in practice7, while
considering two alternative schemes in x6. Under the base penalty scheme, when the suppliers
employment of child labor is discovered by the manufacturer in internal inspections, the supplier
is mandated to perform a corrective action by paying the child worker a monetary compensation
of m (> 0) and rehiring an adult to complete production. The compensation m reects living and
education costs in a certain country. The provision of such stipends is important to avoid children
from moving from one workplace to another, and it is often required by industry agreements (e.g.,
the Atlanta Agreement in the footwear industry and the agreement among Bangladesh Garment
Manufacturers and Exporters Association, ILO and UNICEF). For simplicity, we assume that the
detection occurs at the beginning of production8, and that wages are paid at the end of production;
thus when a child worker is found, s/he is removed with no wage but the monetary compensation
m, and the adult worker is rehired at the adult wage sH . When the suppliers employment of
child labor is discovered by third parties in external inspections, the supplier will lose a fraction
or all of future business from the manufacturer. We assume that the suppliers opportunity cost
of losing future business is  (> 0) times his prot from the current order; thus, the manufacturer
can increase the suppliers opportunity cost by leaving more prot to the supplier through a high
wholesale price. Let () denote the suppliers expected labor cost saving from hiring child labor
when the manufacturer has chosen her internal inspection level . Then we can express () as
()  sH   f(1  ) sL +  (sH +m)g = (sH   sL)  (sH   sL +m) : (2)
Using (), we can express the suppliers expected prot  as
(w; ; d) = (1  e()d (1  )) (w   sH + d()) : (3)
7For example, IKEA normally required the supplier to implement a corrective action when nding child labor
(IKEAs Position on Child Labour 2003), but when a television program broadcast an investigation report for a
supplier employing child labor in India, IKEA immediately terminated the contract with the supplier (Bartlett et al.
2006). Similarly, Apple requires its suppliers to return child laborers to their homes and pay for their basic needs
if they are found during inspections, whereas Apple terminated its contract with the supplier involved in its most
public child-labor incident (Fernholz 2014).
8We also consider the case in which the internal inspection is conducted randomly at the beginning or end of
production, and nd that such random inspections may not reduce child labor.
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In (3), w   sH + d() represents the suppliers prot when there is no risk of child labor being
detected by third parties. The term e()d (1  ) (w   sH + d()) represents the suppliers ex-
pected opportunity cost due to child labor, in which e() (1  ) represents the probability that the
manufacturer will discontinue her contract with the supplier due to child labor discovered during
external inspections after passing internal inspections.
The manufacturer chooses her wholesale price w and inspection level  to maximize her prot,
and the supplier chooses his child labor employment level d to maximize her prot. In the non-
disclosure scenario, the supplier observes only w, whereas he observes both w and  in the disclosure
scenario. In x4 and x5, we derive rmsequilibrium decisions in the non-disclosure and disclosure
scenarios, respectively. In the online appendix, we present proofs and assumptions on parameters
that rule out unrealistic or uninteresting cases.
4 Non-Disclosure Scenario
In the non-disclosure scenario, the manufacturer does not disclose her internal inspection level 
when o¤ering the contract to the supplier. Thus, in a subgame for a given wholesale price w, the
manufacturer and the supplier simultaneously determine the inspection level  and the child labor
decision d; respectively, anticipating the best response of the other party to his/her own decision.
Throughout the paper we let the superscript nonindicate results in the non-disclosure scenario.
Let (non(w); dnon(w)) denote the equilibrium in the subgame for a given w. Anticipating
(non(w); dnon(w)), the manufacturer solves the following program at the contract stage (S1) to
choose the wholesale price w that maximizes her expected prot U :
max
w
U (w; non(w); dnon(w)) (4)
s:t: w   sH +(non(w)) dnon(w)  0 (5)
non(w) = argmax
2f0;Hg
U (w; ; dnon(w)) = argmax
2f0;Hg
v   w   I ()  e (1  ) gdnon(w) (6)
dnon(w) = argmax
d2f0;1g
(w; non(w); d) = argmax
d2f0;1g
f1 e(1 non(w))dgfw sH+(non(w))dg: (7)
Constraint (5) ensures that the supplier earns non-negative expected prot to accept the contract.
Constraints (6) and (7) ensure that the manufacturers inspection decision non(w) and the sup-
pliers employment decision dnon(w) are the best response to each others equilibrium strategy for
any given w. We rst nd equilibrium (non(w); dnon(w)) in a subgame for a given w from (6) and
(7), and then substitute them into (4) and (5) to nd a subgame-perfect equilibrium wnon.
4.1 Equilibrium in a Subgame of a Fixed w
For any xed w, the supplier determines his best response dnon (; w) to the manufacturers decision
on  by evaluating the di¤erence in his expected prot between hiring child labor and not. We can
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easily show that dnon (; w) is determined as9
dnon (; w) = 1 8 2 fL; Hg for w 2
h
0; sH +
(H)
e(1 H)  (H)

;
dnon (L; w) = 1 and dnon (H ; w) = 0 for w 2
h
sH +
(H)
e(1 H)  (H) ; sH +
(L)
e  (L)

;
dnon (; w) = 0 8 2 fL; Hg for w 2
h
sH +
(L)
e  (L) ;+1

: (8)
From (8), we observe that the manufacturers internal inspections reduce the suppliers child labor
employment when the wholesale price is neither too high nor too low. When the wholesale price is
very low, the supplier always employs child labor to lower his labor cost regardless of the manufac-
turers inspections. Conversely, when the wholesale price is very high, high expected opportunity
costs from contract termination always deter the supplier from hiring child labor.
By evaluating the di¤erence in the manufacturers expected prot between choosing H and
choosing L, we can also obtain the best response function of the manufacturer non (d;w) to the
suppliers decision on d as follows:
non (d = 0; w) = L; 
non (d = 1; w) =
8<: H if I < eHg;L if I  eHg: (9)
Clearly, if the manufacturer expects that the supplier has no incentive to hire any child labor,
then she will not conduct internal inspections (i.e., non (d = 0; w) = L = 0). However, if the
manufacturer expects that the supplier has an incentive to hire child labor, she will conduct internal
inspections (i.e., non (d = 1; w) = H) only when the inspection cost I is lower than the amount of
expected goodwill loss reduced by inspections, eHg.
Finally, using dnon (; w) and non (d;w), we obtain the following xed point (non (w) ; dnon (w))
that satises non (w) = non (dnon (w) ; w) and dnon (w) = dnon (non (w) ; w) 10:
(non (w) ; dnon (w)) =
8>><>>:
(L; 1) if I  eHg and w < sH + (L)e  (L) ;
(L; 0) if w  sH + (L)e  (L) ;
(H ; 1) if I < eHg and w < sH +
(H)
e(1 H)  (H) :
(10)
4.2 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
In this section we study the manufacturers decision on the wholesale price. The manufacturer
determines a wholesale price w that maximizes her expected prot by solving the following program:
max
w
U (w; non(w); dnon(w)) ; s:t: (5): (11)
9We assume that the supplier, if indi¤erent between hiring child labor and not, chooses not to hire child labor.
Similarly, the manufacturer, if indi¤erent between conducting inspections and not, conducts no inspections.
10There is no xed point when w 2
h
sH +
(H )
e(1 H )  (H) ; sH +
(L)
e
 (L)

and I < eHg:
12
Proposition 1 The subgame-perfect equilibrium in the non-disclosure scenario is:
(wnon; non; dnon) =
8>><>>:
(sH + (1= (e)  1) (L) ; L; 0) if non3  I < non1 or fI  non1 and g  non2 g;
(sH  (H) ; H ; 1) if I < minfnon1 ; non3 g;
(sH  (L) ; L; 1) otherwise,
(12)
where non1  eHg; non2  (L) =e2; and non3  (1= (e)  1) (L) +  (H)  ge (1  H).
Proposition 1 presents three possible subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes. The rst outcome
in (12) indicates that, to incentivize the supplier not to employ child labor (i.e., dnon = 0), the
manufacturer should adopt no inspections in equilibrium (i.e., non = L), and o¤er the supplier
the wholesale price sH + (1= (e)  1) (L). This price is higher than his labor cost sH , and the
supplier earns positive surplus. As indicated by our analysis in §4.1, such a price premium deters the
supplier from hiring child labor by imposing high opportunity costs onto the supplier. In the other
two equilibrium outcomes given in (12), however, no price premium is paid. In both outcomes, the
manufacturer pays the wholesale price that covers only the suppliers labor cost of child labor (i.e.,
wnon = sH  (non)), and thus the supplier cannot but employ child labor (i.e., dnon = 1) and
obtain zero surplus. Whether or not the manufacturer undertakes internal inspections separates
these two outcomes. When the manufacturer conducts inspections, the second outcome in (12),
(wnon; non; dnon) = (sH  (H) ; H ; 1), emerges in equilibrium. In this case, child labor will be
replaced with adult labor with probability H . When the manufacturer chooses no inspections, the
third outcome in (12), (wnon; non; dnon) = (sH  (L) ; L; 1), occurs in equilibrium.
This result implies that in equilibrium the manufacturer chooses one of the following three
strategies in the non-disclosure scenario: pay a premium, conduct internal inspections, or do neither
of the rst two. In the rest of this paper, we refer to these strategies as premium alone,inspection
alone, and do-nothing strategies, respectively. The supplier does not employ child labor (i.e.,
dE = 0) under the premium-alone strategy, he employs child labor but the manufacturer makes
e¤ort to replace it (i.e., dE = 1   H) under the inspection-alone strategy, and the manufacturer
makes no e¤ort (i.e., dE = 1) under the do-nothing strategy. This suggests that the premium-alone
(resp., do-nothing) strategy brings about the best (resp., worst) outcome for child labor.11
We next examine the factors that a¤ect the equilibrium strategy. Figure 2 illustrates the
three strategies divided by threshold lines non1 ; 
non
2 and 
non
3 dened in Proposition 1. First, we
observe from Figure 2 that as the goodwill cost g increases, the manufacturer may change her
strategy from do-nothing to premium-alone when the inspection cost I is high, or from do-nothing
to inspection-alone and then to premium-alone when I is low. In the former case, the supplier stops
employing child labor, and in the latter case, the child labor problem is at least alleviated by the
internal inspection (see discussion above). This is intuitive: A high goodwill cost incentivizes the
11 If L > 0, the do-nothing strategy may be called a low-e¤ort strategy. As mentioned earlier, this strategy can be
interpreted similarly to the do-nothing strategy.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Outcomes in the Non-Disclosure Scenario. (Note. Solid arrows indicate how threshold lines
change with , and dashed arrows indicate how threshold lines change with e.)
manufacturer to combat child labor. This result is consistent with industrial examples, in which
rms take actions to combat child labor after they incur a high goodwill cost from intensive media
coverage of their violations. For example, after a television program broadcast IKEAs supplier
employing child labor in India, the company assigned the sta¤ dedicated to monitoring child labor
and set IKEA Way of Purchasing as one of ten strategic priorities (IKEA 2003).
Second, as illustrated in Figure 2, as the manufacturers inspection cost I decreases, the manu-
facturer may change her strategy from do-nothing to inspection-alone when the goodwill cost g is
low, or from premium-alone to inspection-alone when g is high. Although the former impact of I is
intuitive, the latter impact of I is less so and merits some explanation. The latter impact implies
that with a lower inspection cost I, the manufacturer may conduct internal inspections, while pay-
ing no premium to the supplier. This happens because by conducting inspections the manufacturer
can lower the risk of exposing child labor, if any, to the public, and hence has less incentive to
pay a premium to deter the supplier from hiring child labor. Therefore, as the inspection cost I
decreases, the supplier may be induced to hire child labor when the manufacturer moves from the
premium-alone strategy to the inspection-alone strategy in spite of the high goodwill cost g. This
nding implies that various e¤orts of an industry and NGOs to reduce the manufacturers cost
of internal inspection (see §1 for examples) may not always be e¤ective or even weaken the e¤ect
of a high goodwill cost. Additionally, Figure 2 indicates that the manufacturer may also change
her strategy from do-nothing to premium-alone when the inspection cost I decreases from a high
value (i.e., I  max (non1 ; non3 )) to a medium value (i.e., non3  I  non1 ). When I is not very
high (i.e., I  non1 ), the supplier expects that the manufacturer can a¤ord to conduct the internal
inspection and thus would reject the low wholesale price o¤ered under the do-nothing strategy.
However, for the manufacturer, the inspection cost I is still not low enough (i.e., I  non3 ) to make
inspection-only a preferred strategy. Thus, the manufacturer adopts the premium-alone strategy
in this case.
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Third, solid arrows in Figure 2 illustrate that as the ratio of future orders to the current order,
, increases, the threshold lines non2 and 
non
3 move left. This means that when the value of future
business is high, the manufacturer prefers the premium-alone strategy. The reason is as follows.
With a higher , the supplier incurs a larger loss from hiring child labor, leading to a lower price
premium (1= (e)  1) (L) that the manufacturer pays to incentivize the supplier not to employ
child labor. Therefore, the manufacturer is more likely to use the premium-alone strategy in this
case. This suggests that adding more value into business relations could help a manufacturer
address her child labor issue. For example, after su¤ering from a 69% fall in its earnings due to
its scandal of severe labor rights violation in 1997, Nike instituted a new global value chain named
Future Vision that emphasizes exclusive production relationships with its lead suppliers (Lim
and Phillips 2008).
Finally, dashed arrows in Figure 2 illustrate that as the external inspection level e increases, the
threshold lines non2 and 
non
3 move left as in the solid arrows. In addition, the threshold line 
non
1
moves left as well - this e¤ect is unique to e, indicating that a higher e can lead the manufacturer to
choose the inspection-alone strategy to combat child labor. Thus, the internal inspection e¤ort may
be increasing in the external inspection level. This is because under a higher external inspection
level, the manufacturer faces a greater risk of losing consumer goodwill when child labor is employed,
but internal inspections reduce the chance of child labor being exposed to the public. This result
suggests that the increased external inspection level e can help deter the suppliers employment of
child labor when the goodwill cost g is high (i.e., expanding the area where premium-alone is in
equilibrium) or at least alleviate the child labor issue through the internal inspection when g is low
(i.e., reducing the area where do-nothing is in equilibrium).
5 Disclosure Scenario
In the disclosure scenario, the manufacturers inspection level  is disclosed publicly. After observ-
ing the manufacturers decision on , the supplier determines his child labor decision on d. Let
the superscript dis indicate results in the disclosure scenario. At the contract stage (S1), the
manufacturer solves the following program to choose (w; ) that maximizes her expected prot U :
max
w;2f0;Hg
U
 
w; ; ddis (; w)

(13)
s:t: w   sH +() ddis(; w)  0 (14)
ddis (; w) =argmax
d2f0;1g
(w; ; d)=argmax
d2f0;1g
f1  e() (1  ) dgfw   sH+() dg: (15)
Constraint (14) ensures that the supplier earns non-negative expected prots. Constraint (15)
requires that given the manufacturers decisions on w and , the supplier chooses ddis (; w) to
maximize his expected prot. In §5.1 we derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this program,
which is then compared with that in the non-disclosure scenario in §5.2.
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5.1 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
Similar to the non-disclosure scenario, the supplier determines his best response function ddis (; w)
to the manufacturers decision on (; w) by comparing his expected prot between hiring child labor
and not. We obtain the suppliers best response as follows:
ddis (; w) = 1 8 2 fL; Hg for w 2
h
0; sH +
(H)
eL(1 H)  (H)

;
ddis (L; w) = 1 and ddis (H ; w) = 0 for w 2
h
sH +
(H)
eL(1 H)  (H) ; sH +
(L)
eH
 (L)

;
ddis (; w) = 0 8 2 fL; Hg for w 2
h
sH +
(L)
eH
 (L) ;+1

: (16)
Next we substitute ddis (; w) into (13) and (14), and then determine the manufacturers wholesale
price wdis and inspection level dis by solving the following program:
max
w;2f0;Hg
U

w; ; ddis (; w)

; s:t: (14). (17)
Proposition 2 The subgame-perfect equilibrium in the disclosure scenario is:
(wdis; dis; ddis) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

sH +

1
eH
  1

(L) ; L; 0

if g  dis2 ; I  dis3 ; I  dis5
(sH  (H) ; H ; 1) if I  dis1 ; I  dis3 ; g  dis4
(sH  (L) ; L; 1) if I  dis1 ; g  dis2 ; I  dis6
sH +
n
1
eL(1 H)   1
o
(H) ; H ; 0

if I  dis6 ; g  dis4 ; I  dis5 ;
where dis1  (H) (L)+g feH   eL (1  H)g ;dis2  (L) =
 
e2H

;dis3  (H)+ (L) = (eH) 
(L) eLg (1  H) ;dis4  (H) =fe2L (1  H)2g;dis5  (H) (L) (H) = feL (1  H)g+
(L) = (eH) ;and dis6  (H) + eHg  (H) = feL (1  H)g  (L).
The rst three equilibrium outcomes given in Proposition 2 correspond to the premium-alone,
inspection-alone, and do-nothing strategies, respectively. In addition, the fourth equilibrium out-
come shows a new premium & inspection strategy, under which the manufacturer conducts
internal inspections (i.e., dis = H) and at the same time pays a price premium (i.e., wdis =
sH+f1= (eL (1  H))  1g (H)). Under this strategy, no child labor is used as in the premium-
alone strategy. Thus, unlike the inspection-alone strategy which induces child labor employment,
the manufacturer does not face the risk of goodwill loss from child labor by paying a price premium
to the supplier under the premium & inspection strategy. Moreover, by conducting internal inspec-
tions, this strategy pays a lower price premium to the supplier than the premium-alone strategy
as discussed earlier in §4.2: The manufacturer replaces some of the price premium with inspection
e¤ort, thus leaving less surplus to the supplier.
To examine the factors that a¤ect the equilibrium strategy, in Figure 3 we illustrate the four
equilibrium strategies, which are divided by the threshold lines dis1 ; 
dis
2 ; :::; 
dis
6 dened in Propo-
sition 2. Similar to the non-disclosure scenario, as the goodwill cost g increases, the manufacturer
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Outcome in the Disclosure Scenario: (a) Low m, (b) Medium m, and (c) High m. (Note. Solid
arrows indicate changes with , long-dash arrows indicate changes with eL, and round-dot arrows indicate changes
with eH .)
may change her strategy from do-nothing to premium-alone or inspection-alone. In the disclosure
scenario, as the goodwill cost g increases further, the manufacturer may change her strategy from
do-nothing or inspection-alone to premium & inspection strategy. This may explain Nestlés recent
practice: Facing the lawsuit over child slavery in Ivory Coast, Nestlé started to provide premiums to
farmers for maintaining social standards in addition to an internal monitoring and remediation sys-
tem for child labor (Nestlé 2012). Nestlé also publishes on its own website the internal monitoring
e¤orts that the company has taken (Nestlé 2017).
The impact of inspection cost I on the equilibrium strategy in the disclosure scenario di¤ers from
that in the non-disclosure scenario. Recall in the non-disclosure scenario that a lower inspection
cost I may change the equilibrium strategy from premium-alone to inspection-alone, resulting in
more child labor. However, in the disclosure scenario, this is found only in Figure 3(a) for a smaller
range of goodwill cost g (than that in Figure 2), but not in Figure 3(b)-(c) due to the existence
of premium & inspection strategy in the disclosure scenario. This suggests that in the disclosure
scenario a lower inspection cost is less likely or even unlikely to result in more child labor. Nike, for
example, posts its audit data and standards in its corporate social responsibility report since 2005,
and has established its scalable monitoring system, while providing premiums to its suppliers. The
company has been a leader in the industry in social responsibility (Nisen 2013).
In the disclosure scenario, the suppliers penalty of using child labor m (i.e., the amount of
compensation the supplier pays to the child worker discovered during internal inspections) plays an
important role. We can observe from Figure 3(a)-(c) that asm increases, the premium & inspection
strategy is more likely to be in equilibrium, whereas the inspection-alone strategy is less likely to
be in equilibrium, and it is no longer in equilibrium when m is su¢ ciently large. The reason is
as follows. When the manufacturer conducts internal inspections, an increase of the suppliers
penalty m reduces the suppliers expected labor cost saving from using child labor (i.e., (H)
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in (2) decreases with m). With the reduced benet of using child labor, the manufacturer can
deter the supplier from hiring child labor by paying a lower price premium (i.e., the price premium
(1= (eL (1  H))  1) (H) decreases with m). Therefore, under the premium & inspection
strategy, the manufacturers expected prot increases with the penalty m. In contrast, under the
inspection-alone strategy, an increase of m reduces (H) ; which in turn increases the wholesale
price sH  (H). This happens because the supplier uses child labor under this strategy, and the
manufacturer has to pay a higher wholesale price to compensate a loss in the suppliers expected
labor cost saving from using child labor. Therefore, the manufacturers expected prot decreases
with the penalty m under the inspection-alone strategy. As a result, with a higher m, this strategy
is less likely to be in equilibrium, whereas the premium & inspection strategy is more likely to be in
equilibrium. This nding suggests that when the manufacturer can enforce a high penalty onto the
supplier from internal inspections, the manufacturer can adopt the premium & inspection strategy
and combat child labor more e¤ectively.
Lastly, it is not di¢ cult to verify from Figures 2 and 3 that the impact of  is the same in both
non-disclosure and disclosure scenarios, and the impact of eL on dis3 as well as the impact of eH on
dis2 and 
dis
3 are similar to the corresponding impacts of e in the non-disclosure scenario. Notice
that eL has no impact on dis2 because 
dis
2 is the threshold between do-nothing and premium-alone
strategies and the external inspection level is eH under both strategies. The impacts of eL and
eH on dis4 and 
dis
6 can be explained similarly. We also nd that eL and eH have opposite impacts
on dis1 and 
dis
5 . Interestingly, when the manufacturer pays no premium to the supplier under the
two strategies divided by dis1 , she has more incentive to conduct internal inspections (i.e., adopt
inspection-alone strategy instead of do-nothing) as eH increases or eL decreases; on the contrary,
when the manufacturer pays the premium under the two strategies divided by dis5 , she has less
incentive to conduct internal inspections (i.e., adopt premium & inspection strategy instead of
premium-alone) as eH increases or eL decreases. The reason is that when the manufacturer pays
no premium, a high external inspection level means a high chance for her to incur the goodwill
cost, whereas when she pays the premium, a high external inspection level means a lower premium
required by the supplier to employ an adult laborer. Our results imply that if NGOsreactions to
the manufacturers low e¤ort are strong, the manufacturer would prefer the inspection-alone (resp.,
premium-alone) strategy to the do-nothing (resp., premium & inspection) strategy.
5.2 E¤ects of Information Disclosure
In this section we examine the e¤ects of information disclosure by comparing the equilibrium out-
comes in the non-disclosure scenario with those in the disclosure scenario. For ease of comparison,
we rst present the result when eH = eL = e, and then the result when eH > e > eL.
First, we consider the case when eH = eL = e: Figure 4 which overlaps Figure 2 with Figure 3
illustrates that there are four areas R (a)   R (d) in which the equilibrium outcomes are di¤erent
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Figure 4: Comparison of Equilibrium Outcomes between the Non-Disclosure Scenario in Figure 2 and the Disclosure
Scenario in Figure 3 when eH = eL = e: (a) Low m, (b) Medium m, and (c) High m.
between the two scenarios; see Table 1 for precise conditions for these four areas. The comparison
of the two scenarios reveals the e¤ects of information disclosure on the manufacturers prot, the
suppliers prot, and child labor as summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Information disclosure will lead to the following results, ceteris paribus:
(a) The suppliers prot remains the same in R (a), decreases in R (b) or R (d), and increases in
R (c).
(b) The manufacturers prot increases in all areas.
(c) The expected amount of child labor dE increases in R (a) or R (b), decreases in R (c), and
remains the same in R (d).
Table 1: Manufacturers Equilibrium Strategy: Non-Disclosure Scenario vs. Disclosure Scenario
Area
Equilibrium Outcomes:
Non-Disclosure ! Disclosure
Conditions
R (a) Inspection Alone !Do-Nothing max  dis1 ; dis6  I  min  non1 ; dis3 
R (b) Premium Alone !Do-Nothing max  dis3 ; dis6   I  non1 and g  dis2
R (c) Inspection Alone !Premium & Inspection I  min  dis3 ; dis6  and g  dis4
R (d) Premium Alone !Premium & Inspection dis3  I min
 
dis5 ; 
dis
6

Proposition 3(a) indicates that the e¤ect of information disclosure on the suppliers prot depends
on how the disclosure of internal inspection e¤ort changes the manufacturers equilibrium strategy in
each area. When the manufacturer pays no premium in R (a) under both scenarios, the suppliers
prot remains the same. Yet, when the manufacturer eliminates the premium in the disclosure
scenario in R (b) or reduces the premium in R (d), the disclosure of internal inspection e¤ort hurts
the suppliers prot. Finally, when the manufacturer changes her strategy from paying no premium
into paying a premium in R (c), the supplier benets from information disclosure.
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Contrary to the e¤ect of information disclosure on the supplier, Proposition 3(b) states that the
disclosure of internal inspection e¤ort always benets the manufacturer. The reason is as follows.
On the one hand, if the manufacturer discloses a high inspection level, then the new strategy of
premium & inspection can potentially lead to a higher prot. On the other hand, if she discloses a
low inspection e¤ort, then the supplier would accept a low wholesale price, thereby benetting the
manufacturer. This can be easily seen by inspecting program (4)-(7) which includes an additional
(incentive) constraint (6) with respect to the manufacturers inspection level as compared with
program (13)-(15). This result may explain the observation in the empirical literature (e.g., To¤el
and Short 2011) that rms have incentives to voluntarily disclose their social responsibility e¤orts.
We can also show that if the manufacturer discloses  after the supplier accepts the contract (rather
than before the supplier does so as in Figure 1), her expected prot is the same as that in the non-
disclosure scenario. Proposition 3(b) indicates that when eH = eL = e, the manufacturer prefers
to disclose  before the supplier accepts the contract rather than after.
Proposition 3(c) shows that information disclosure indeed reduces the use of child labor in
R (c). In this case, driven by a high goodwill cost and a low inspection cost, the manufacturer
has a strong incentive to combat child labor by using the combined strategy of both inspection
and premium in the disclosure scenario. However, in the non-disclosure scenario, the manufacturer
cannot use that strategy because the premium in the combined strategy is not as high as the one in
the premium-alone strategy. Thus, without the knowledge of comprehensive internal inspections,
the premium in the combined strategy is not high enough to prevent the supplier from using child
labor. However, Proposition 3(c) also suggests that information disclosure may not necessarily
reduce child labor. Specically, Table 1 shows that the disclosure of internal inspection e¤ort may
induce the manufacturer to change her equilibrium strategy from the inspection-alone strategy in
R (a) or the premium-alone strategy in R (b) (both of which combat child labor) to the do-nothing
strategy (which takes advantage of low-cost child labor). This change to the do-nothing strategy
occurs when the manufacturer faces a low goodwill cost (i.e., g  dis2 ) and has a low inspection
cost (i.e., I  non1 ). In the non-disclosure scenario, however, the manufacturer could not adopt the
do-nothing strategy in R (a) or R (b) because, without the knowledge of the low inspection level,
the supplier would reject the low wholesale price o¤ered under the do-nothing strategy. With such
a low inspection cost, the supplier would expect that the manufacturer could a¤ord to conduct
internal inspections in order to reduce the chance of child labor being exposed to the public and
thereby reduce the risk of a goodwill loss.
To minimize such adverse e¤ects, industries and third parties should reduce the manufacturers
incentive to use the do-nothing strategy in the two areas R (a) and R (b). There are several intuitive
measures that can help achieve this goal. First, the manufacturer may disclose only a minimum level
of inspection e¤ort, and possibly raise her e¤ort later. When the supplier expects the manufacturer
to do so, even if the manufacturer discloses low inspection e¤ort, the supplier may not accept the
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low wholesale price associated with low inspection e¤ort. Thus, the adverse e¤ect of information
disclosure could be mitigated. Furthermore, this does not a¤ect the premium & inspection strategy
because the manufacturer can still disclose high inspection e¤ort under this strategy. Second,
increasing the goodwill cost g by arousing more consumer awareness of child labor will be helpful
because this will increase the manufacturers potential loss from the incidence of child labor. Third,
if third-party organizations can help the manufacturer to reduce the inspection cost I by facilitating
industry collaboration or improving a monitoring system (see §1), then the manufacturer would be
more willing to conduct inspections to combat child labor.
Next, we discuss the e¤ects of information disclosure in the following two cases (while providing
a detailed analysis in the online appendix): (i) third party organizations increase their external
inspection levels for those manufacturers who disclose low internal inspection levels (i.e., eH > e =
eL), and (ii) third party organizations reduce their external inspection levels for those manufacturers
who disclose high internal inspection levels (i.e., eH = e > eL).
Corollary 1 (i) Suppose eH > e = eL. Information disclosure will lead to three additional changes
in equilibrium outcome: from do-nothing to premium-alone, from inspection-alone to premium-
alone, and from do-nothing to premium & inspection. In these cases, (a) the suppliers prot
increases; (b) the manufacturers prot may decrease if do-nothing is changed to premium-alone or
premium & inspection; (c) the expected amount of child labor dE decreases.
(ii) Suppose eH = e > eL. Information disclosure will lead to three additional changes in equilibrium
outcome: from do-nothing to premium & inspection, from do-nothing to inspection-alone, and from
premium-alone to inspection-alone. In these cases, (a) the suppliers prot increases, stays the
same or decreases, respectively; (b) the manufacturers prot increases; (c) the expected amount of
child labor dE decreases, decreases or increases, respectively.
Corollary 1(i) shows that the manufacturers strategy may change from do-nothing or inspection-
alone in the non-disclosure scenario to premium-alone or premium & inspection in the disclosure
scenario, indicating that paying premium is more preferred if third party organizations increases
their external inspection levels for those manufacturers who disclose low internal inspection lev-
els. As a result of the change in the manufacturers strategy, the suppliers prot increases and
the amount of child labor decreases as shown in Corollary 1(i)-(a) and (c). This result suggests
that raising the external inspection level for the manufacturer who discloses the low internal level
can enhance the e¤ectiveness of information disclosure to combat child labor. On the other hand,
Corollary 1(i)-(b) shows that the manufacturers prot may decrease as her strategy changes from
do-nothing in the non-disclosure scenario to premium-alone or premium & inspection in the dis-
closure scenario. In this case, the manufacturer does not choose the do-nothing strategy in the
disclosure scenario because this strategy would bring in signicant loss under a higher level of ex-
ternal scrutiny. If the manufacturer can choose the timing of the disclosure, in this case, she would
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choose to disclose  after the supplier accepts the contract because then her expected prot would
be the same as that in the non-disclosure scenario.
Corollary 1(ii) shows that if third party organizations reduce their external inspection levels
for those manufacturers who disclose high internal inspection levels (i.e., eH = e > eL), the man-
ufacturers strategy may change from do-nothing or premium-alone in the non-disclosure scenario
to inspection-alone or premium & inspection in the disclosure scenario, indicating that inspection
is more preferred. If the manufacturer replaces the premium with the inspection, the suppliers
prot decreases and the amount of child labor increases as shown in Corollary 1(ii)-(a) and (c).
The manufacturers prot always increases as shown in Corollary 1(ii)-(b) because a lower level of
external scrutiny results in lower goodwill loss on expectation.
Note that we assume the manufacturer discloses her inspection e¤ort truthfully, since the infor-
mation provided in its website (as required by the Act), social responsibility report, contract with
the supplier, or agreement with a third-party organization is in general veriable. In the case when
such information is not veriable, the manufacturer may not always have an incentive to disclose
her inspection e¤ort truthfully. The manufacturer may voluntarily disclose a low inspection e¤ort
truthfully when a higher level of external scrutiny reduces the price premium that the manufacturer
needs to pay in order to incentivize the supplier not to employ child labor under the premium-alone
strategy (i.e., g  dis2 and I  max(dis3 ; dis5 )). In this case, the Act may well be irrelevant, since
even without it the manufacturer would still choose to disclose her inspection e¤ort for her own
benet. However, the manufacturer may not have such an incentive when a higher level of exter-
nal scrutiny brings in a signicant goodwill loss under the do-nothing strategy (i.e., g  dis2 and
I  max(dis1 ; dis6 )). In this case, if the manufacturer selectively reveals the information, she would
choose not to disclose her inspection e¤ort. The implementation of the Act, which requires the
manufacturer to truthfully disclose her inspection e¤ort, can increase the manufacturers inspection
e¤ort or the price premium, resulting in less child labor in this case.
6 Other Penalty Schemes
In this section, we analyze two alternative penalty schemes: zero tolerance in §6.1 and corrective
actions only in §6.2. We compare results under these schemes with those under the base penalty
scheme.
6.1 Zero Tolerance
Under this penalty scheme (for which we use zeroin a subscript of our notation), if the supplier
does not pass internal inspections, the manufacturer terminates the contract with the supplier. The
manufacturer switches to a backup supplier with additional cost a ( 0). Following the literature
(e.g., Guo et al. 2015, Plambeck and Taylor 2016), we assume for simplicity that the back-up
supplier is a reliable one (i.e., using no child labor), although it can be more expensive. The
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manufacturers expected prot under this scheme is given as
Uzero (w; ; d) = v   w   I ()  e()gd (1  )  da:
Under this penalty scheme, if the supplier employs a child laborer (i.e., d = 1), his labor cost is
sL (which is di¤erent from (1  ) sL+  (sH +m) under the base penalty scheme). If the supplier
employs an adult laborer (i.e., d = 0), his labor cost is sH , so his cost saving from using child labor
is revised from (2) to zero = sH   sL for any  2 fL; Hg. The suppliers prot function becomes
zero (w; ; d) = (1  d ( + (1  ) e())) (w   sH + dzero) :
Note that we assume the supplier loses the future orders from the manufacturer if he does not
pass internal inspections. Our insights continue to hold in the case when the supplier also loses
the current order. Following the same procedure as presented in x4, we can derive the following
subgame-perfect equilibrium in the non-disclosure scenario:
Corollary 2 Under the zero-tolerance scheme, the subgame-perfect equilibrium in the non-disclosure
scenario is
fwnonzero; nonzero; dnonzerog =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(sH +zero=e zero, L; 0) if non3;zero  I < non1;zero or
fI  non1;zero and g  non2;zerog;
(sH  zero; H ; 1) if I < minfnon1;zero; non3;zerog;
(sH  zero; L; 1) otherwise,
where non1;zero = eHg   aH ; non2;zero = zero=e2 and non3;zero = zero=e  ge (1  H)  aH .
As expected, this scheme has no impact on do-nothing and premium-alone strategies, since the
manufacturer does not conduct internal inspections under these strategies. Under the inspection-
alone strategy, the equilibrium wholesale price becomes sH   zero = sH   (sH   sL) = sL;
which is lower than the wholesale price under the base penalty scheme, while being equal to the
wholesale price under the do-nothing strategy. This is because under the new scheme the supplier
will not have a chance to replace a child laborer with an adult laborer after internal inspections, so
the suppliers labor cost is the same under both inspection-alone and do-nothing strategies. The
lower wholesale price under the zero-tolerance scheme indicates that the manufacturer prefers this
penalty scheme to the base penalty scheme if she implements the inspection-alone strategy (i.e.,
I < minfnon1 ; non3 ; non1;zero; non3;zerog).
We can show that under the zero-tolerance scheme, the e¤ects of the goodwill cost g and the
inspection cost I on the equilibrium strategy of the manufacturer are the same as those under the
base penalty scheme. Therefore, increasing the goodwill cost g can incentivize the manufacturer to
combat child labor under the zero-tolerance scheme, whereas decreasing the inspection cost I may
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induce the manufacturer to move from the premium-alone strategy to the inspection-alone strategy
and lead to more child labor.
We next examine the e¤ects of the zero-tolerance scheme in the disclosure scenario. We can
derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium similarly as follows.
Corollary 3 Under the zero-tolerance scheme, the subgame-perfect equilibrium in the disclosure
scenario is
wdiszero,
dis
zero; d
dis
zero
	
=8>>>>><>>>>>:

sH +

1
eH
  1

zero; L; 0

if g  dis2;zero; I  dis3;zero; I  dis5;zero;
(sH  zero; H ; 1) if I  dis1;zero; I  dis3;zero; g  dis4;zero;
(sH  zero; L; 1) if I  dis1;zero; g  dis2;zero; I  dis6;zero;
sH +
n
1
(H+(1 H)eL)   1
o
zero; H ; 0

if g  dis4;zero; I  dis5;zero; I  dis6;zero,
where dis1;zero = g feH   eL (1  H)g aH ; dis2;zero = zero=e2H ; dis3;zero = zero=eH geL (1  H) 
aH ; 
dis
4;zero =
zero
e2L(1 H)(H+(1 H)eL)
  aHeL(1 H) ; dis5;zero =
zero
eH
  (L)(H+(1 H)eL) ; and dis6;zero =
geH   zero(H+(1 H)eL) .
Similar to the non-disclosure scenario, the zero-tolerance scheme has no impact on do-nothing and
premium-alone strategies, and results in a lower wholesale price (than the base penalty scheme)
under the inspection-alone strategy. Interestingly, as a result of the lower wholesale price, the
inspection-alone strategy has become so prevailing that the adverse e¤ect of information disclosure
(that introduces more child labor by inducing the manufacturer to switch from the inspection-
alone strategy or the premium-alone strategy to the do-nothing strategy) no longer exists under
this scheme; i.e., R (a) and R (b) do not exist in Figure 4 as manufacturers in these two areas would
choose the inspection-alone strategy instead of the do-nothing strategy in the disclosure scenario.
This implies that information disclosure combined with the zero-tolerance scheme helps reduce
child labor in supply chains. For example, after Samsung disclosed its e¤ort to combat child labor
and announced its zero-tolerance scheme on child labor in 2014, the company is reported to be on
a "meteoric rise" in terms of improved corporate social responsibility (Samsung 2014, Wang 2016).
Under the premium & inspection strategy in the disclosure scenario, we nd that the wholesale
price can be higher or lower than that under the base penalty scheme. When a child laborer is found
during internal inspections, the supplier loses future business under the zero-tolerance scheme, while
he has to undertake costly corrective actions under the base penalty scheme. Depending on which
penalty is more costly, the wholesale price that the supplier would accept for employing no child
labor is di¤erent under these two schemes. As a result, when the manufacturer implements the
premium & inspection strategy (i.e., g  minfdis4 ; dis4;zerog and I  minfdis5 ; dis6 ; dis5;zero; dis6;zerog),
she does not always prefer the zero-tolerance scheme to the base penalty scheme. This may explain
why this scheme is not a preferred choice by many rms including Apple, IKEA and Nike.
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6.2 Corrective Actions Only
Under the penalty scheme that requires only corrective actions (for which we use only in a
subscript of our notation), the manufacturers prot function is the same as that under the base
penalty scheme; i.e., Uonly (w; ; d) = U (w; ; d). If the supplier employs a child laborer (i.e., d = 1),
then the suppliers cost di¤ers depending on whether she passes internal or external inspections:
it is sL when he passes both internal and external inspections, sH + m when he does not pass
internal inspections, or sL + m when he passes internal inspections but does not pass external
inspections (since the supplier need not rehire an adult laborer after completing production). Thus,
the suppliers expected cost saving from hiring a child laborer is revised from (2) to only() =
(sH  sL)(1 )(1 e()) m+(sH  sL m)(1 )e(). Under this penalty scheme, the supplier
does not lose future business from the manufacturer, so his prot function becomes
only (w; ; d) = w   sH + donly():
As the manufacturers wholesale price has no impact on the suppliers child labor decision, the
supplier employs child labor as long as he can save his labor cost in expectation from hiring child
labor (i.e., only() > 0). The following corollary presents equilibrium for any xed w (ref. (8)
under the base penalty scheme) in the non-disclosure scenario.
Corollary 4 Under the penalty scheme that requires only corrective actions, the following results
hold for any w:
(a) dnononly (; w) = 1 8 2 fL; Hg if only (L) > only (H)  0;
(b) dnononly (L; w) = 1 and d
non (H ; w) = 0 if only (L) > 0  only (H) ;
(c) dnononly (; w) = 0 8 2 fL; Hg if 0  only (L) > only (H) :
Corollary 4 suggests that under this scheme the manufacturer adopts either inspection-alone or
do-nothing strategy. Under both strategies, the manufacturer chooses low wholesale prices that
leave the supplier zero surplus. We can further show that as the goodwill cost g increases or the
inspection cost I decreases, the manufacturer moves from the do-nothing strategy to the inspection-
alone strategy, resulting in less child labor. The impact of decreasing I is di¤erent from the base
penalty scheme, under which it may result in more child labor. This result suggests that NGOs
initiatives in reducing manufacturersinspection costs are e¤ective when the manufacturers adopt
the penalty scheme that requires only corrective actions.
Note that the suppliers expected cost saving from hiring a child laborer under this penalty
scheme is lower than that under the base penalty scheme (i.e., only()  ()). When the
goodwill cost g is small, the manufacturer implements the inspection-alone or do-nothing strategy.
In this case, since the manufacturer pays sH only () (resp., sH ()) under this scheme (resp.,
the base scheme), she prefers the base scheme to this scheme. When the goodwill cost g is large, the
manufacturer can use the premium-alone strategy to avoid the large goodwill loss under the base
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scheme, whereas she cannot avoid that loss under the penalty scheme that requires only corrective
actions. As a result, we can conclude that the manufacturer always prefers the base scheme to this
scheme.
In the disclosure scenario, the manufacturer cannot adopt the premium & inspection strat-
egy to combat child labor, and information disclosure has no impact under this penalty scheme.
This is again because the manufacturer can inuence the suppliers decision only through internal
inspections but not through wholesale price.
7 Households Decision for Sending Children to Work
In our base model, when the manufacturer nds a child laborer during internal inspections, she
requires the supplier to provide the child the compensation. In practice, the amount of the com-
pensation is crucial to determine whether such a practice is e¤ective in combating child labor.
Specically, if the compensation is so low that the household still cannot a¤ord the childs living
expenses or schooling, then the household may send the child back to work, perhaps, in a di¤erent
factory. Therefore, in this section, we enrich our model by considering a households decision, and
identify the situation where the compensation fails to keep the child away from working even after
the child is removed from the suppliers site. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we de-
rive conditions under which a household would send its child back to work. Second, we study the
manufacturers choice on the compensation provided to children found during internal inspections.
Finally, we discuss the conditions under which the compensation is not su¢ cient for the household
to keep its child away from working.
First, we introduce a households utility function u, which is modied from the one in Basu
and Zarghamee (2009) by taking into account the education of a child. For simplicity, we assume
that the household has one working adult and one child. The household chooses its consumption
level c ( 0), a proportion rs (2 [0; 1]) of the childs time for school, and a proportion rw (2 [0; 1]
and rs + rw  1) of the childs time for work. The household has a minimal level of consumption
v ( 0). If its consumption is higher than this level, then the household cares about the childs
education rs (Ranjan 2001). The households utility function can be expressed as12
u(c; rs) =
8<:rs if c  vc  v if c < v: (18)
Let ts ( 0) denote the childs full-time education cost. When a child is found during the man-
ufacturers internal inspection, the supplier provides the child the compensation which consists of
two parts: the education support me (0  me  ts) and the living support mv ( 0) to satisfy the
12Following Basu and Zarghamee (2009), this function assumes that the household cares little about consumption
beyond the minimum level. Our results hold as long as the household places su¢ ciently lower weight on excess
consumption beyond the minimum level than on the childs education.
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childs basic needs. In practice, some companies require their suppliers to provide only the educa-
tion support (IKEA 2003), while others require both (Apple 2016). For any given compensations
me and mv; the households problem is to determine (c; rs; rw) by solving the following program:
max
c;rs;rw0; rs+rw1
u(c; rs)
s:t: c  sH + rwsL +mv
rsts  sH + rwsL +mv   c+me:
(19)
The rst constraint in (19) ensures that the households consumption level does not exceed its
income plus the living compensation. The second constraint ensures that the childs education cost
does not exceed the households surplus from consumption plus the education compensation.
Lemma 1 The households optimal decision on the childs proportion of working time rw is
rw =
8>>><>>>:
0 if mv +me  v + ts   sH
max
n
v sH mv
sL
; v+ts sH mv mesL+ts
o
if mv +me < v + ts   sH & mv  v   sL   sH
1 if mv +me < v + ts   sH & mv < v   sL   sH :
(20)
Lemma 1 shows that the household would never send its child to work when the adults wage sH
cover the minimal consumption level v and the childs full time education cost ts (i.e., v+ts sH  0).
In this case, the compensation from the supplier is irrelevant. Thus, we focus on the case where
v + ts   sH > 0 in the rest of this section. Lemma 1 also suggests that the household would keep
its child from working when the total compensation mv +me plus the adult wage sH covers the
minimum consumption v and the childs full time education cost ts (i.e., mv +me + sH  v + ts);
otherwise, the household would send its child back to work either part time (if receiving low total
compensation with mv +me < v + ts   sH but high living compensation with mv  v   sL   sH)
or full time (if receiving low total compensation as well as low living compensation).
Next, we analyze the manufacturers decision on the compensation. We generalize two as-
sumptions in the base model: (1) When determining inspection level , the manufacturer is also
allowed to choose m 2 fme;me + mvg (i.e., o¤er only education support or both education and
living support). We assume that these decisions are made simultaneously because the compensa-
tion is relevant only when child labor is caught by the internal inspection. (2) The supplier can
choose a proportion of child labor in its production (i.e., d 2 [0; 1] instead of d 2 f0; 1g). For the
non-disclosure scenario, our analysis shows that the manufacturer would adopt a new strategy in
equilibrium, called partial-premium & inspectionin addition to the three strategies identied in
the base model. Under this new strategy, the manufacturer conducts internal inspections and pays
the supplier a partial premium, which induces the supplier to hire only a portion of workforce,
dI = I=(eHg); with child labor. The following corollary presents the manufacturers choice on the
compensation in the non-disclosure scenario:
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Corollary 5 In the non-disclosure scenario, suppose that the manufacturer chooses m 2 fme;me+
mvg endogenously, and that the supplier chooses a portion of child labor d 2 [0; 1].
(a) If internal inspections are not conducted (i.e.,  = L), the manufacturer is indi¤erent between
me and me +mv.
(b) If internal inspections are conducted (i.e.,  = H), the manufacturer chooses me under the
inspection-alone strategy and me +mv under the partial-premium & inspection strategy.
When the manufacturer conducts no inspections under the strategy of do-nothing or premium-alone,
the manufacturer is obviously indi¤erent between me and me+mv because no compensation would
be provided. When the manufacturer conducts inspections under the inspection-alone strategy, the
manufacturer prefers me to me +mv because it reduces the suppliers expected cost of employing
child labor, hence allowing the manufacturer to pay a lower wholesale price. However, under the
partial-premium & inspection strategy, the manufacturer prefers me+mv because higher compen-
sation reduces the premium the manufacturer pays to the supplier. For the disclosure scenario,
we nd that the manufacturer still chooses one of the four strategies in equilibrium: do-nothing,
inspection-alone, premium-alone, and premium & inspection. We can also show that the manu-
facturers choice on the compensation is the same as Corollary 5, except that she would choose
me +mv under the premium & inspection strategy.
Finally, we discuss the e¤ect of the manufacturers compensation choice on the households
decision to send its child back to work. Note that such e¤ect exists only when the manufacturer
conducts inspections and the supplier employs child labor. From our earlier discussions and Corol-
lary 5, this is the case when the manufacturer chooses the inspection-alone strategy or the partial
premium & inspection strategy in the non-disclosure scenario, or the inspection-alone strategy in
the disclosure scenario. (Recall that the supplier does not employ child labor under the premium
& inspection strategy in the disclosure scenario.) Combining this observation with Lemma 1, we
derive the conditions under which the household may send its child back to work even after the
child is removed from the suppliers site.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the manufacturer chooses m 2 fme;me+mvg endogenously, and that
the supplier chooses a portion of child labor d 2 [0; 1]. Then the compensation provided to the child
workers found during the manufacturers internal inspections cannot keep them from working under
the following conditions:
(i) v   sH > 0 or me < v   sH + ts when the manufacturer adopts the inspection-alone strategy in
both non-disclosure and disclosure scenarios;
(ii) me+mv < v sH+ ts when the manufacturer adopts the partial-premium & inspection strategy
in the non-disclosure scenario.
Case (i) indicates that when the manufacturer chooses the inspection-alone strategy, the compen-
sation cannot keep children from working under one of two conditions. First, if the households
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minimum consumption level exceeds the adult wage (i.e., v   sH > 0), its child always needs to
work. Second, even if the adult wage is higher than the households minimum consumption level
(i.e., v   sH  0), the child still needs to work for the tuition to receive more education when the
full-time education cost cannot be covered by the sum of the surplus (after consumption) and the
education compensation (i.e., sH v+me < ts). Therefore, in order to keep children from working,
it is important to ensure that a su¢ cient amount of the education compensation is provided to
them. Case (ii) applies when the manufacturer adopts the partial-premium & inspection strategy.
In this case, the compensation would fail only if a total amount of the education and living com-
pensations is too low (i.e., me + mv < v   sH + ts). In other words, di¤erent from case (i), no
matter the households minimum consumption level exceeds the adult wage or not, the child does
not need to work with a su¢ cient amount of the total compensation. Further, the condition that
me+mv < v  sH + ts is stronger than the condition me < v  sH + ts in case (i). Taken together,
these results suggest that the compensation chosen by the manufacturer is less likely to keep chil-
dren away from working when the manufacturer adopts the inspection-alone strategy. Therefore,
governmental and non-governmental organizations should ensure that su¢ cient compensation is
provided to child workers, especially when manufacturers use the inspection-alone strategy without
paying a su¢ ciently high wholesale price to their suppliers.
Lastly, we note that there are some features regarding the households decision that may warrant
future study. For example, while we consider a representative household in this section, households
are heterogeneous in reality, e.g., in terms of their consumption levels. In addition to wages,
households may have other sources of income.
8 Conclusion
Nearly 200 million children are engaged in child labor, many in developing countries that are part
of the supply base of global manufacturing networks. Even when rms have incentives to address
child labor in their supply chains, they are hindered by the lack of direct control over their suppliers.
This paper studies several initiatives that aim to address the challenge of combating child labor
in global supply chains. We develop a game-theoretic model based on a two-tier supply chain, in
which a multinational manufacturer in a developed nation selling the product made by a supplier
in a developing country. The supplier has an option to use child labor in place of legitimate labor
at a lower cost, and if child labor is exposed to the public, the manufacturer would incur a goodwill
loss. The suppliers labor practice is subject to costly but imperfect inspections from both the man-
ufacturer and third-party organizations. In addition to inspections, the manufacturer also deals
with child labor through her supply contract. We analyze how several factors (such as goodwill
cost, inspection cost, future business, external monitoring, and penalty scheme) a¤ect the manufac-
turers incentives to use di¤erent strategies to combat child labor. Furthermore, motivated by the
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, we examine the impact of information disclosure
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Figure 5: Strategies and initiatives to combat child labor
by comparing the non-disclosure scenario (in which the supplier and third-party organizations are
unable to observe the manufacturers inspection e¤ort) with the disclosure scenario (in which they
are informed of such e¤ort).
Our ndings have the following implications to multinational manufacturers (or retailers) and
NGOs (see Figure 5 for the summary). First, if a manufacturer adopts the base or zero-tolerance
penalty scheme, she can reduce the incidence of child labor by directly undertaking inspections to
detect and remove child labor, or alternatively she can deter child labor by o¤ering a su¢ ciently
high wholesale price to the supplier. However, if a manufacturer adopts the penalty scheme that
requires only corrective actions, she can only use inspections to combat child labor. Second, if a
manufacturer adopts the zero-tolerance scheme, she should consider disclosing her e¤ort to combat
child labor through her website, social responsibility report, or contract. Such disclosure enables
the manufacturer to increase the prot through a strategy that combines internal inspection and
medium wholesale price. However, if a manufacturer adopts the base penalty scheme, extra caution
should be taken in considering information disclosure as it may inadvertently introduce more child
labor when the manufacturer relies only on internal inspections to combat child labor. Third,
NGOs should help to raise manufacturers goodwill costs, for example, through campaigns and
consumer education, because this will help reduce the use of child labor in supply chains no matter
which penalty scheme the manufacturer uses. Fourth, if a manufacturer adopts the penalty scheme
that requires only corrective actions, NGOs should help to reduce the manufacturers inspection
costs (e.g., by facilitating industry collaboration or improving a monitoring system). However,
if the manufacturer adopts the base or zero-tolerance penalty scheme, NGOs need to be careful
about doing so as it may not be e¤ective in combating child labor and even weaken the e¤ect
of high goodwill costs. Lastly, to prevent children from going back to work after being removed
from one suppliers site, governmental and non-governmental organizations should ensure that a
su¢ cient amount of compensation is provided to those children, especially when manufacturers rely
on inspections without paying a su¢ ciently high wholesale price to their suppliers.
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A. Di¤erent External Inspection Levels
In this section, we discuss the case of eH > e > eL in details. For ease of presentation, we rst
present the comparison between the two scenarios for each of the two cases: (i) eH > e = eL and
(ii) eH = e > eL, respectively, and then based on these comparisons we discuss the results for
eH > e > eL.
Table 2: Manufacturers Equilibrium Strategy under Di¤erent External Inspection Levels: Non-Disclosure Scenario
vs. Disclosure Scenario in Case (i) eH > e = eL and Case (ii) eH = e > eL
Case Area
Equilibrium Outcomes:
Non-Disclosure ! Disclosure Conditions
(i) R (e) Do-Nothing ! Premium Alone I  max  non1 ; dis5  and dis2  g  non2
(i) R (f) Inspection Alone ! Premium Alone max  dis3 ; dis5   I  non3 and g  dis2
(i)&(ii) R (g) Do-Nothing ! Premium & Inspection non1  I  min
 
dis5 ; 
dis
6

and g  non2
(ii) R (h) Do-Nothing ! Inspection Alone non1  I  min
 
dis1 ; 
dis
3

and g  non2
(ii) R (l) Premium Alone ! Inspection Alone non3  I  min
 
dis1 ; 
dis
3

and g  dis4
First, for case (i) eH > e = eL, Figure 6 illustrates that there are seven areas R (a)   R (g) in
which the equilibrium outcomes are di¤erent between the two scenarios. Out of the seven areas,
the rst four areas R (a) R (d) have the same outcome changes and conditions as their respective
areas in Table 1, and the details for the three new areas R (e)   R (g) are provided in Table 2.
In R(e), the manufacturers strategy changes from do-nothing to premium-alone. This change is
driven by the premise that the manufacturer who discloses the low internal inspection level is under
a higher level of external scrutiny (i.e., eH > e). As a result, the supplier faces a higher chance of
being penalized for hiring child labor. This lowers the price premium (1= (eH)  1) (L) that the
manufacturer needs to pay in order to incentivize the supplier not to employ child labor. Therefore,
the manufacturer is more likely to use the premium-alone strategy in the disclosure scenario. The
same explanation applies to R(f) in which the manufacturers strategy changes from inspection-
alone to premium-alone. Similarly, in R(g); the manufacturers strategy changes from do-nothing
to premium & inspection because the manufacturer is less likely to choose the do-nothing strategy
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Figure 6: Comparison of Equilibrium Outcomes between the Non-Disclosure Scenario and the Disclosure Scenario
for Case (i) (eH > e = eL) with: (a) Low m, (b) Medium m, and (c) High m.
in the disclosure scenario.
Second, we examine case (ii) eH = e > eL, in which third party organizations reduce their
external inspection level for the manufacturer who chooses the high internal inspection level in the
disclosure scenario. Figure 7 illustrates that there are seven areas R (a)   R (d) ; R(g); R(h), and
R(l) in which the equilibrium outcomes are di¤erent between the two scenarios. Similar to the rst
case, the rst four areas R (a) R (d) are the same as their respective areas in Table 1. In addition,
the area R(g) is the same as that in case (i). The precise conditions for the two areas R(h) and
R(l) are provided in Table 2. In R(h), the manufacturers strategy changes from do-nothing to
inspection-alone. In R(l), the manufacturers strategy changes from premium-alone to inspection-
alone. Thus, in both R(h) and R(l); the manufacturer changes to the inspection-alone strategy
in the disclosure scenario. This is because the manufacturer who discloses the high-level internal
inspection faces a lower level of scrutiny from NGOs (i.e., eL < e). This gives additional incentives
for manufacturers to undertake high-level internal inspections.
Lastly, we discuss the case when eH > e > eL. Since this case is a combination of cases (i) and
(ii) above, there are possibly nine areas R(a) R (l) in which the equilibrium outcomes are di¤erent
between the two scenarios for eH > e > eL. In particular, out of the nine areas, R(a)  R (d) and
R (g) are caused by the information disclosure, R(e) R (f) are caused by the premise that eH > e,
and R(h) R (l) are caused by the premise that e > eL.
B. Proofs of Analytical Results
We make the following assumptions to rule out unrealistic or uninteresting cases: (A1) e()  1,
(A2) H  sH   sL
sH   sL +m , (A3) H  1 
m
(sH   sL +m) e; and (A4)
(H)
eL(1 H)  (H) <
(L)
eH
 
(L). (A1) rules out the case where the supplier would never hire child labor even when no
internal inspection is undertaken. With (A2), we do not consider an uninteresting case where the
manufacturers internal inspections stop the supplier from hiring child labor for every wholesale
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Figure 7: Comparison of Equilibrium Outcomes between the Non-Disclosure Scenario and the Disclosure Scenario
for Case (ii) (eH = e > eL) with: (a) Low m, (b) Medium m, and (c) High m.
price w. (A3) and (A4) ensure that the suppliers expected prot from hiring child labor is lower
when the manufacturer conducts inspections than when no inspections are undertaken in the non-
disclosure and disclosure scenarios, respectively; otherwise the supplier would be more likely to hire
child labor when the manufacturer chooses a higher inspection level, which is unrealistic.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we simplify the program (11) by substituting (non(w); dnon(w))
given in (10) into (11), and obtain
max
w
8><>:
U (w; L; 1) = v   w   eg where w = sH  (L) if I  non1
U (w; L; 0) = v   w where w = sH + (L)e  (L)
U (w; H ; 1) = v   w   eg (1  H), where w = sH  (H) if I < non1 :
Next we solve for the equilibrium wholesale price wnon. If I  non1 , the manufacturer chooses
w = sH + (1= (e)  1) (L) when
U (sH + (1= (e)  1) (L) ; L; 0)  U (sH  (L) ; L; 1), g  non2 :
If I < non1 , the manufacturer chooses w = sH + (1= (e)  1) (L) when
U (sH + (1= (e)  1) (L) ; L; 0)  U (sH  (H) ; H ; 1), I  non3 :
As a result, the outcome (sH + (1= (e)  1) (L) ; L; 0) is in equilibrium if and only if fI  non1 ,
g  non2 g or fI < non1 ; I  non3 g, the outcome (sH  (H) ; H ; 1) is in equilibrium if and only
if I < non1 and I < 
non
3 , and the outcome (sH  (L) ; L; 1) is in equilibrium otherwise. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Substituting ddis (; w) given in (16) into (17) and simplifying it, we
obtain
max
w;
8>>>><>>>>:
U (w; ; 1) = v   w   I ()  e () (1  ) g where w = sH  () ;
U (w; L; 1) = v   w   eH (1  L) g where w = sH + (H)eH(1 H)  (H) ;
U (w; H ; 0) = v   w   I where w = sH + (H)eL(1 H)  (H) ;
U (w; ; 0) = v   w   I () where w = sH + ()e()(1 )  () :
In the above, the second U (w; L; 1) is dominated by the rst U (w; ; 1) when  = L because
w = sH +
(H)
eL(1 H)  (H) is larger than w = sH  (L) by sH +
(H)
eL(1 H)  (H) > sH >
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sH   (L). Also, the third U (w; H ; 0) is a special case of the fourth U (w; ; 0) when  = H .
Therefore, we can simplify the above maximization program into the following:
max

8<: U (sH  () ; ; 1) = v   (sH  ())  I ()  e () (1  ) g;U sH + ()e()(1 )  () ; ; 0 = v   sH + ()e()(1 )  ()  I () : (21)
From (21), we obtain ddis = 1 if and only if:
U (sH  (L) ; L; 1)  U

sH +
(L)
eH(1 L)  (L) ; L; 0

, g  dis2 when  = L; (22)
U (sH  (H) ; H ; 1)  U

sH +
(H)
eL(1 H)  (H) ; H ; 0

, g  dis4 when  = H : (23)
In the rest of the proof, we provide the remaining conditions under three possible structures of
the equilibrium outcome that depend on the value of m. Lemmas 2-4 together prove Proposition
2. Figures 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) illustrate the equilibrium presented in Lemmas 2-4, respectively. We
present the proof of Lemma 2 here, while omitting the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4. For convenience,
we rewrite assumptions (A2) and (A3), respectively, as m  m  (1  H) (sH   sL)
H
and m 
m  (eH   eL + eLeHH) (1  H) (sH   sL)
HeH [1  eL (1  H)] . 
Lemma 2 When m  m < m1  1e2HH
 
e2H   e2L (1  H)

(1  H) (sH   sL) and
 <
1
eH + eL (1  H) , the equilibrium outcome of program (21) is

wdis; dis; ddis

=
8>>>>><>>>>>:

sH +

1
eH
  1

(L) ; L; 0

if g  dis2 ; I  dis3 ; I  dis5 ;
(sH  (L) ; L; 1) if I  dis1 ; g  dis2 ;
(sH  (H) ; H ; 1) if I  dis1 ; I  dis3 ; g  dis4 ;
sH +
n
1
eL(1 H)   1
o
(H) ; H ; 0

if g  dis4 ; I  dis5 .
(24)
Proof of Lemma 2. The condition  <
1
eH + eL (1  H) ensures that there exists m 2 [m;m1) ;
and the condition m < m1 suggests that dis4 > 
dis
2 . Given that 
dis
4 > 
dis
2 , program (21) can be
simplied as follows:
max fU (sH  (L) ; L; 1) ; U (sH  (H) ; H ; 1)g if g  dis2 ;
max
n
U (sH  (H) ; H ; 1) ; U

sH +
(L)
eH
 (L) ; L; 0
o
if dis2 < g  dis4 ;
max
n
U

sH +
(L)
eH
 (L) ; L; 0

; U

sH +
(H)
eL(1 H)  (H) ; H ; 0
o
if g > dis4 :
Therefore, we obtain the following results:
(i) (sH  (L) ; L; 1) is the equilibrium outcome if and only if g  dis2 and
U (sH  (L) ; L; 1)  U (sH  (H) ; H ; 1), I  dis1 : (25)
(ii) (sH  (H) ; H ; 1) is the equilibrium outcome if and only if

g  dis2 ; I  dis1
	
,
or

dis2 < g  dis4 , I  dis3
	
, where
U (sH  (H) ; H ; 1)  U

sH +
(L)
eH
 (L) ; L; 0

, I  dis3 : (26)
We can show that these conditions can be further simplied to g  dis4 ; I  dis3 , and I  dis1 .
(iii)

sH +
(L)
eH
 (L) ; L; 0

is the equilibrium outcome if and only if

dis2 < g  dis4 , I  dis3
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or

g > dis2 , I  dis5
	
, where
U

sH +
(L)
eH
 (L) ; L; 0

 U

sH +
(H)
eL (1  H)  (H) ; H ; 0

, I  dis5 : (27)
Similar to (ii), these conditions can be simplied to g > dis2 ; I  dis3 and I  dis5 .
(iv)

sH +
(H)
eL(1 H)  (H) ; H ; 0

is the equilibrium outcome if and only if g > dis4 and I 
dis5 . 
Lemma 3 When m1  m  m2  1H (sH   sL) (1  H)

1  (1 H)e2L
eH eL(1 H)+e2L(1 H)2

and  <
1
eH + eL (1  H) , the equilibrium outcome of program (21) is
 
wdis; dis; ddis

=
8>>>>><>>>>>:

sH +

1
eH
  1

(L) ; L; 0

if g  dis2 ; I  dis5 ;
(sH  (L) ; L; 1) if I  dis1 ; g  dis2 ; I  dis6 ;
(sH  (H) ; H ; 1) if I  dis1 ; g  dis4 ;
sH +
n
1
eL(1 H)   1
o
(H) ; H ; 0

if I  dis6 ; g  dis4 ; I  dis5 :
Lemma 4 When

m2 < m < m;  <
1
eH + eL (1  H)

or  >
1
eH + eL (1  H) , the equilib-
rium outcome of program (21) is
 
wdis; dis; ddis

=
8>><>>:

sH +

1
eH
  1

(L) ; L; 0

if g  dis2 ; I  dis5 ;
(sH  (L) ; L; 1) if g  dis2 ; I  dis6 ;
sH +
n
1
eL(1 H)   1
o
(H) ; H ; 0

if I  dis6 ; I  dis5 :
Proof of Proposition 3. (a) The suppliers prot is 0 under the inspection-alone strategy or the
do-nothing strategy, (1= (eH)  1) (L) under the premium-alone strategy, and f1= (eL (1  H))  1g
(H) under the premium & inspection strategy, where (1= (eH)  1) (L) > f1= (eL (1  H))  1g
(H). From Table 1, we can verify the change of the suppliers prot in each area.
(b) The proof is provided in the main body.
(c) This can be veried from the change of the manufacturers strategy shown in Table 1. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Case (i): Refer to Table 2 for the conditions under which an equilibrium
strategy is changed from one strategy to another.
(a) This can be easily proved similarly to the proof of Proposition 3(a).
(b) First, we prove that in the case of eH > e = eL the manufacturers prot increases as the
manufacturer changes her strategy from inspection-alone in the non-disclosure to do-nothing or
premium-alone or premium & inspection in the disclosure scenario. The manufacturers prot
under the inspection-alone strategy in the non-disclosure scenario is U ((sH  (H) ; H ; 1)) =
v   (sH  (H))   I   eg (1  H), and that under the do-nothing strategy in the disclosure
scenario is v  (sH  (L)) eHg. The latter is higher than the former when e = eL, as suggested
by the condition I  dis1 = (H) (L) + g feH   eL (1  H)g (see the condition for R (a) in
Table 1). Similarly, we could show that when e = eL the manufacturers prot under the premium-
alone strategy in the disclosure scenario v 

sH +

1
eH
  1

(L)

 U ((sH  (H) ; H ; 1)) ;
as suggested by the condition I  dis3 = (H) +  (L) = (eH)   (L)   eLg (1  H) (see
the condition for R (f) in Table 2), and her prot under the premium & inspection strategy in the
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disclosure scenario v 

sH +
n
1
eL(1 H)   1
o
(H)

 I  U ((sH  (H) ; H ; 1)) ; as suggested
by the condition g  dis4 = (H) =fe2L (1  H)2g (see the condition for R (c) in Table 1).
Second, when eH > e, as the manufacturer changes her strategy from premium-alone in the non-
disclosure to do-nothing in the disclosure scenario, her prot increases from v 

sH +

1
e   1

(L)

to v  (sH  (L))  eHg; as suggested by the conditions g  dis2 = (L) =
 
e2H

(see the con-
dition for R (b) in Table 1). Similarly, when eH  e, as the manufacturer changes her strategy from
premium-alone in the non-disclosure to premium & inspection in the disclosure scenario, her prot
increases from v 

sH +

1
e   1

(L)

to v 

sH +
n
1
eL(1 H)   1
o
(H)

 I; as suggested
by the condition I  dis5 = (H)   (L)   (H) = feL (1  H)g + (L) = (eH) (see the
condition for R (d) in Table 1).
However, the manufacturers prot may decrease as the manufacturer changes her strategy
from do-nothing to premium-alone or premium & inspection. Table 3 provides the conditions
under which the manufacturers prot decreases (or increases).
Table 3: Manufacturers Prot Change under Di¤erent External Inspection Levels: Non-Disclosure Scenario vs.
Disclosure Scenario in Case (i) (eH > e = eL)
Equilibrium Outcomes:
Non-Disclosure ! Disclosure Do-Nothing ! Premium Alone Do-Nothing ! Premium & Inspection
Prot in Non-Disclosure v   (sH  (L))  eg v   (sH  (L))  eg
Prot in Disclosure v   sH   ( 1eH   1)(L) v   sH   ( 1eL(1 H)   1)(H)  I
Prot Di¤erence U :
Disclosure - Non-Disclosure
eg   (L)eH eg  (L)  ( 1eL(1 H)   1)(H)  I
Conditions for U < 0
I  max(non1 ; dis5 ) and
dis2  g  eHe dis2 (= eeH non2 )
I  max(non1 ; dis6   (eH   e)g);
I  min  dis5 ; dis6  and g  eeH non2
Conditions for U  0 I  max(
non
1 ; 
dis
5 ) and
eH
e 
dis
2  g  non2
non1  I  min
 
dis5 ; 
dis
6   (eH   e)g

and g  non2
(c) This can be veried from the change of the manufacturers strategy.
Case (ii): Refer to Table 2 for the conditions under which an equilibrium strategy is changed from
one strategy to another.
(a) This can be easily proved similarly to the proof of Proposition 3(a).
(b) Following the proof of case (i)-(b), it is not di¢ cult to verify that in the case of eH = e > eL,
the manufacturers prot increases as the manufacturer changes her strategy from inspection-alone
in the non-disclosure to do-nothing or premium & inspection in the disclosure scenario (under the
same condition provided by the proof of case (i)-(b) for R (a) and R (c) in Table 1, respectively).
Similarly, we can show that the manufacturers prot increases as the manufacturer changes her
strategy from premium-alone in the non-disclosure to do-nothing or premium & inspection in the
disclosure scenario in the case of eH = e > eL (under the same condition provided by the proof of
case (i)-(b) for R (b) and R (d) in Table 1, respectively).
Next we prove how the manufacturers prot changes when eH = e. First, as the manufacturer
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changes her strategy from do-nothing to premium & inspection, her prot changes from v  (sH  
(L))   eg to v   sH   ( 1eL(1 H)   1)(H)   I, and her prot increases under the condition
I  dis6 = (H)+eHg (H) = feL (1  H)g (L) (see the condition for R (g) in Table 2).
Second, as the manufacturer changes her strategy from do-nothing to inspection-alone, her prot
changes from v (sH (L)) eg to v (sH  (H)) I eLg (1  H), and her prot increases
under the condition I  dis1  (H) (L) + g feH   eL (1  H)g (see the condition for R (h)
in Table 2). Finally, as the manufacturer changes her strategy from premium-alone to inspection-
alone, her prot changes from v sH ( 1e 1)(L) to v (sH  (H)) I eLg (1  H), and her
prot increases under the condition I  dis3  (H)+ (L) = (eH) (L) eLg (1  H) (see
the condition for R (l) in Table 2).
(c) This can be veried from the change of the manufacturers strategy. 
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we claim that for the optimal rs and rw the constraint rs + rw  1 is
always tight (i.e. rs + rw = 1); otherwise if rs + rw < 1, through increasing rw one could always
increase the optimal c or rs and thus the households utility u(c; rs). Then the households utility
maximization program in (19) is equivalent to the following program:
max
c;rs0
u(c; rs) =
8<:rs c  v;c  v c < v:
s:t: sLrs + c  sH + sL +mv
(ts + sL) rs + c  sH + sL +mv +me
The above program could be solved graphically, giving the following solution
rs =
8>>><>>>:
1 if mv +me  v + ts   sH
min
n
sH+sL+mv v
sL
; sH+sL+mv+me vsL+ts
o
if mv +me < v + ts   sH & mv  v   sL   sH
0 otherwise:
which suggests that
rw =
8>>><>>>:
0 if mv +me  v + ts   sH
max
n
v sH mv
sL
; v+ts sH mv mesL+ts
o
if mv +me < v + ts   sH & mv  v   sL   sH
1 otherwise:

Proof of Corollary 5. (a) For ease of exposition, let mL = me and mH = me +mv. Similar to
() in the base model, we dene
(;m)  sH   f(1  ) sL +  (sH +m)g = (sH   sL)  (sH   sL +m) :
It is easy to see that for  = L = 0, (L;m) = sH   sL 8m 2 fmL;mHg. Since m a¤ects the
suppliers and the manufacturers prots only through (;m), we conclude that when  = L, the
manufacturer is indi¤erent between mL and mH .
(b) The derivation of the subgame-perfect equilibrium under a portion of child labor d (2 [0; 1])
is similar to that of the base model. In the equilibrium, we nd that when internal inspections
are conducted (i.e.,  = H), the manufacturers wholesale price is w = sH  (H ;m) under the
inspection-alone strategy. Since the manufacturers prot is decreasing in w and (H ;mL) >
(H ;mH) ; the manufacturer prefers mL to mH in this case. On the other hand, under the
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partial-premium & inspection strategy, we obtain w =

1
e (1  H)   2dI

(H ;m)+sH ; where
dI =
I
eHg
. In the parameter regions where the equilibrium exists, we have
1
e (1  H)   2dI > 0;
so the manufacturer prefers mH to mL in this case. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Case (i): According to Corollary 5 (and its discussion below), when
the manufacturer adopts the inspection alone strategy in either scenario, the manufacturer chooses
the education compensation me, which suggests that mv = 0 in this case. Substituting mv = 0
into (20) suggests that rw > 0 if and only if me < v + ts   sH . Since me  ts, the inequality
me < v + ts   sH always holds if 0 < v   sH , irrespective of the amount of me.
Case (ii): According to Corollary 5, when the manufacturer adopts the partial-premium & in-
spection strategy in the non-disclosure scenario, the manufacturer chooses to pay the sum of ed-
ucation and living compensation me + mv. Then from (20) we know that rw > 0 if and only if
me +mv < v + ts   sH . 
C. Examples of Companies Disclosing No or Low-Level Inspection E¤orts
 Caterpillar Inc.: "We do not currently verify our product supply chain or audit suppliers specically to
evaluate risks of human tra¢ cking and slavery or require our direct suppliers to certify that materials
incorporated into products comply with laws regarding slavery and human tra¢ cking in the coun-
tries in which they are doing business." (Source: www.caterpillar.com/en/company/suppliers/supplier-
conduct.html, Accessed on January 31, 2015 and July 7, 2016)
 Danaher Corp.: "Accordingly, Danaher Corporation does not verify its supply chains to evaluate the
risks of human tra¢ cking or slavery, audit its suppliers for compliance with or require suppliers to cer-
tify compliance with the laws regarding human tra¢ cking and slavery" (Source: www.danaher.com/sites
/default/les/California_Transparency_in_Supply_Chains_Act_of
_2010.pdf, Accessed on January 31, 2015 and July 7, 2016)
 IDEX Corporation: "Although IDEX Units expect their suppliers to comply with applicable laws and
frequently obtain agreements and certications from their key suppliers relating to compliance with
applicable laws in supplying products to them, IDEX Units do not verify their supply chain or audit
suppliers specically to evaluate risks of human tra¢ cking and slavery or require their suppliers to
certify specically that products supplied to them were not produced with child labor or slave labor."
(Source: http://idexcorp.com/terms/SupplyChainTransparency. asp, Accessed on January 31, 2015
and July 7, 2016)
 Hyundai Motor America: "Hyundai has no policy regarding, and does not monitor, human tra¢ ck-
ing and slavery in its direct product supply chain." (Source: https://www.hyundaiusa. com/terms-
conditions.aspx, Accessed on January 31, 2015 and July 7, 2016)
 Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc.: "We do not engage in verication of product supply chains to evaluate
and address risks of human tra¢ cking and slavery, nor conduct audits of suppliers to evaluate sup-
plier compliance with company standards against tra¢ cking and slavery in supply chains." (Source:
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http://www.krispykreme.com/SharedContent/Media/FormsLib/supply_
chains_act.pdf, Accessed on January 31, 2015 and July 7, 2016)
 Orora North America: "Orora has not (a) reviewed its product supply chains to evaluate and address
risks of human tra¢ cking and slavery or employed a third party to audit or evaluate such risks, (b)
established entity standards on human tra¢ cking and slavery and then conducted supplier audits
to evaluate whether suppliers comply with standards." (Source: http://www.mppmfg.com/docs/CA-
Transparency-Supply-Chain-Act.pdf, Accessed on January 31, 2015 and July 7, 2016)
 Overhill Farms, Inc.: "Overhill Farms does not (1) engage in verication of product supply chains
to determine and address risks of human tra¢ cking and slavery; (2) conduct audits of suppliers to
determine supplier compliance with company standards for human tra¢ cking and slavery in supply
chains;" (Source: http://www.overhillfarms.com/pdf/Supply%20Chains%20
Act%20Disclosure%20_OFI_%20Final1.pdf, Accessed on January 31, 2015 and July 7, 2016)
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